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Economics: The Precocious Social Science 
 
Gayatri Sarin 
 
Section 1.1 Introduction 
The perception that economics no longer fits 
squarely into the domain of the social sciences enjoyed a 
brief bout of attention from philosophers of science in the 
early 1980s. Thereafter, interest in the scientific status of 
economics has waned, on at least one account, because 
economists ‘are not particularly anxious about the scientific 
respectability of their discipline’ (Rosenberg 1983). The title 
of the article by Gordon (1978) “Should Economists Pay 
Attention to Philosophers?” (his answer is a firm ‘no’) is 
telling of the attitude to the debate, and the reluctance of 
philosophers and economists alike to participate in it. 
Nevertheless, economic theories are powerful tools that 
shape the landscape of politics and so deserve to be 
scrutinized by philosophers of science.   
 This paper evaluates some of the criticisms leveled 
against the methodology of economics in order to discuss 
whether economics can ever attain a status comparable to 
that of the natural sciences. The aim is to paint a picture of 
what modern economics is by comparing it with historical 
developments in the sciences. It is my contention that the 
problems economics faces are the same as those historically 
faced by the physical sciences and if they differ, they do so 
in degree alone, and not in kind. Further, the fact that 
economics deals with human beings may forever closet it in 
the social science buildings, however, the empirical rigor of 
its claims can, in principle, be at par with those of the 
physical sciences. 
 
  143 
 
Section 1.2. Science and Demarcation Criteria 
 For the purpose of this paper, I will draw on the work 
of Thagard to discuss some general criteria for evaluating 
the scientific status of a discipline. His principles will 
provide the structural framework of my defense of the 
empirical status of the subject of economics. I have selected 
his principles because they build on the strengths of Kuhn’s, 
Popper’s and Lakatos’ demarcation criteria, and outline 
some generally agreed upon characteristics of good science. 
Though none of the following criteria guarantee a theory a 
place in scientific community, when taken together they 
provide a fairly accurate picture of how science should be: 
Briefly, for a discipline to be considered scientific, it needs 
to be: 
1.  Verifiable – ‘A theory is said to be verifiable if it is 
possible to deduce observation statements from it’ 
(Thagard 1978). The derivation of observation 
statements links to the second criterion - falsification. 
2. Falsifiable – Through experimentation, a theory or its 
claims must be potentially falsifiable. Though 
falsification can sometimes only occur once a better 
theory comes along, the proliferation of modifying 
auxiliary hypotheses to “save” a theory reveal a 
theory’s lack of falsifiability. 
3. Have an appropriate ‘Theory, Community and 
Historical Context’ – ‘theory’ delineates the familiar 
elements of ‘structure, prediction, explanation and 
problem solving’ of the heuristic apparatus of the 
subject. Thagard puts special emphasis on the nature 
of the community of practitioners of a discipline in 
that he asks, ‘Are the practitioners in agreement on 
the principles of the theory?’; ‘Are they actively 
involved in attempts at confirming and disconfirming  
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their theory?’ (Thagard 1978). If one answers no the 
above questions, the theory in question should be 
considered pseudo-scientific. Even if the theory fulfills 
this criterion, it could fail to be scientific if it has been 
less progressive than alternative theories over a long 
period of time (historical context), or if there has been 
little effort to increase the scope and accuracy of its 
explanations (progressiveness). 
With these criteria in mind, I proceed to investigate the 
claims made against economics, in light of its alleged failure 
to qualify as an empirically scientific discipline.  
 
Section 2.1. – Verifiability and Controlled Experiments 
In Philosophy of Natural Science, Carl Hempel 
discusses the importance of testability in the demarcation 
between science and non-science. He rejects the idea that a 
theory without testable implications can ever be considered 
to have scientific content: 
If a statement or set of statements is 
not testable at least in principle, in 
other words, if it has no test 
implications at all, then it cannot be a 
scientific hypothesis or theory, for no 
conceivable empirical findings can 
then accord or conflict with it. – 
Hempel Philosophy of Natural 
Science 
If there exists no encounter of a theory with the empirical 
world that can potentially verify its claims, the theory must 
be tossed out as non-science. The first objection to the status 
of economics as a science deals with the heuristic apparatus 
of the subject.  
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Edward Leamer, an influential economist, 
acknowledges the characteristic preponderance of debate 
and scarcity of agreement between the various schools of 
economic thought. The prolonged limbo between acceptance 
and rejection of theories in economics is linked to this first 
major criticism of the subject: Its inability to produce 
controlled experiments. For the predictions of any science to 
bear any conviction, they need to be testable in the empirical 
world. It has been argued that the methodology of 
economics, making sweeping assumptions that – 
notwithstanding reality - are difficult to test out, guards it 
from ever being falsified through experimentation. 
Economists regularly jump to the task of making policy 
recommendations, ‘despite the lack of a single accepted 
theory’ (Leamer1996) making their claims rather dubious. 
Experimentation is thus the crucial hurdle that is needed for 
a discipline that relies on subjective interpretation to convey 
its findings.  
 Historically speaking though, Astronomy and 
Cosmology faced similar difficulties in controlled testing but 
still managed to secure a position in the scientific 
community. Many young sciences that began with limited 
data have been able to extract scientific theories from the 
natural experiments available for study. For example, 
Lindzen’s (1990) reference1 to narrative of the development 
of the diurnal nature of tides in atmospheric sciences makes 
economics seem like it might be on a similar trajectory: 
For a long time theory and data 
leapfrogged each other, with theory 
postulating mechanisms on which 
little data were available, the data 
                                                
1 In Leamer (1996) 
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becoming available and contradicting 
the theory and new theory then 
emerging. Because the amount of data 
was large and it was error ridden, 
something like what economists call 
reduced-form modeling went on 
continually in order to extract patterns 
from the noisy data. 
Economics faces the same problems that atmospheric 
science once faced in that there is sometimes a natural 
barrier against experimentation2. Since the subjects of study 
in economics are human beings, on whom experimentation 
(with taxes, migration, poverty) may not be permissible, the 
best an economist can do is to seek out natural experiments 
from history to test a theory. Ideal test conditions resemble 
sudden shocks to the economy, like a sudden influx of 
immigrants, a crop failure, or a trade boom, where ceteris 
paribus conditions roughly. A popular joke among 
economists is that sometimes, “Doing econometrics is like 
trying to learn the laws of electricity by playing the radio” 
(Leamer 1983), a reference to the rudimentary tools 
available for economic analysis.  
When economists spot powerful natural experiments, 
the tests of their theories become more robust. When 
theories hold over several different data sets and are 
confirmed by different economists, they gain objectivity. 
This methodology is well established in the medical 
practice, where often the assessment of evidence is 
statistical, or probabilistic, and theories are technically at the 
most only verifiable through tests, though no less scientific.  
                                                
2 Laboratory testing, widespread in experimental economics does 
actually involve controlled tests. Experimental economists are a minority 
in the profession, but will likely be more commonplace in the future.  
  147 
 
The debate about the effect of smoking on lung cancer 
developed along similar lines, where correlations between 
the two variables were measured in different populations to 
expose a causal connection between the two.  
The fact that economics may seem to proceed 
without making testable observation statements probably 
comes from a misguided expectation of natural science-like 
experiments from the economics department. A broader 
perspective on the development of sciences reveals that 
several other disciplines faced the same problem with 
experimentation and verification (in differing degrees) and 
still attained a scientific standing. 
Section 2.2 Confirmation and Diversity  
 Another expectation of a science is that it must not 
develop in isolation from the web of knowledge developing 
around it. The more a theory is corroborated with existing 
sciences, the better the chances of it being considered a 
science itself. On the view of Buchannan and Vanberg 
(1990), the retrospective approach that economics takes is 
very similar to the approach taken by earlier versions of 
evolutionary theory. I would argue that economics today 
might look quite similar to what evolutionary theory looked 
like soon after Darwin’s ‘On the Origins of Species’. In both 
disciplines, the intuition of a central unyielding trend (in 
evolution- natural selection; in economics- the invisible 
hand of the market) is used to explore and systematize a 
range of possible theories by seeking out experiments in the 
natural world. Both deal with phenomena that have strong 
stochastic elements that often vary rapidly over time, and 
neither are able to specify crucial tests. Evolutionary theory 
has been inducted into science because it has received 
confirmation from a wide range of academic disciplines. 
Geology, Biology, Archeology and Paleontology have all  
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produced evidence in support of evolutionary theory, so 
though none have conclusively proven the phenomena, the 
diversity in its sources of confirmation makes the case for its 
likely truth. Whether the claims put forward by economists 
have been confirmed in a variety of disciplines will be 
important to evaluating its scientific standing. 
Given that most of economics does not use 
controlled experiments to test out theories, one might think 
that confirmation is a vague and subjective issue in 
economics. Though, accepted, the greater need for 
interpretation in economics makes confirmation of theories 
less straightforward, there are conventions in place that lay 
out the economist’s equivalent of  “good science”. A good 
economist would reserve his judgment on a theory until it 
has been shown to hold in a variety of contexts, times and 
places. For example, expansionary fiscal policy that would 
work to circumvent a recession in Costa Rica, might cause 
hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, because the institutions there 
are much weaker. This indicates that results in economics 
are less generalizable, and may seem opaque to the non-
economist. Within the discipline, however, there is a 
formalized standard battery of tests to confirm and evaluate 
a theory. Conventions such as robustness tests of errors, a 
decent R-square3, a coefficient magnitude that has some 
meaning4 and statistical significance at the 5% level5, all 
indicate that the ‘community of practitioners’ is actively 
seeking to test and confirm economic theories in a variety of 
contexts.  
                                                
3 It measures the percentage of variation in data explained by the model 
4 Sometimes coefficients are statistically significant (not 0), but are so 
close to 0 that in economic terms they have no meaning. 
5 There is less than 5% of a chance that the result observed would have 
obtained if there was no significant correlation between the variables. 
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Section 2.3. Scope of Explanations and Accuracy of 
Predictions 
 In 1983, when Rosenberg was writing about the state 
of economics as a science he argued that it failed to be a 
progressive research program because neither was the 
precision of its predictions improving, nor was the scope of 
its explanations increasing. These now dated criticisms 
provide an ideal opportunity to discuss how economics 
today looks very different from economics twenty-five years 
ago.   
 In terms of scope, experimental and behavioral 
economics have made vast contributions to the subject of 
economics in the past few decades. Voter turnout, behavior 
of the family, investments in human capital, crime and 
punishment, game theory, institutions, business cycles, 
learning curves all show that economics is lending and 
borrowing from the other social sciences. The scope of 
economics has increased so rapidly as to prompt a 
reactionary movement dubbed ‘economic imperialism’ in 
the other social sciences. I am a firm believer that no science 
that purports to explain everything should really be called a 
science (as per Popper’s demarcation criteria). But that more 
aspects of human behavior can now be explained in 
economic terms shows that economics is becoming 
increasingly corroborated with other academic disciplines. 
The lending and borrowing of tools from statistics and 
mathematics6, coupled with the creation of new subfields  
                                                
6 Another fundamental development in economics, worth mentioning is 
in macroeconomics. In the last few decades for the first time 
macroeconomists started to explicitly model time. Prior to this 
macroeconomics hinged on an ‘enormous compression of time’, 
making its models simple, elegant but incomprehensible in terms of 
how their predictions bore out in the real world (Levine 2008). The 
  150 
 
like behavioral economics all indicate that economics is 
contributing to and expanding the web of science.  
 
Section 3.1. The Empirical Status of Economics 
 Thus far, I have addressed some of the 
common objections to economic methodology. In no 
way do I think that economics could or should 
attempt to become a natural science, simply because 
its object of study is not the natural world. What is 
interesting to me is whether its predictions and 
theories can attain the empirical rigor accorded to the 
hard sciences. I have found that many areas of study 
that now belong to the hard sciences have initially 
faced difficulties like the absence of controlled 
experiments, the need to interpret the results with 
limitations in objectivity, and so these should not 
rule out the possibility of economics becoming a 
more empirical science.  
A common angle taken on by denouncers of the 
empirical status of economics has to do with its 
mathematical form. A good amount of microeconomic 
theory is entirely deducible from a handful of axioms and a 
basic understanding of calculus. For example, the law of 
demand is deducible from a mathematical feature of the 
shape of utility curves (that they are concave). The core of 
microeconomic theory is sometimes viewed as so immutable  
                                                
dynamic modeling of time made possible a distinction between short 
run effects and long run effects of policy changes, making 
fundamental contributions to the predictive scope of macroeconomic 
models itself. Macroeconomic models today bear little resemblance to 
their elegant predecessors, a change deliberately made to increase the 
empirical content of the subject at the cost of conventional attributes 
of theories. 
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that its claims are in simple logical truisms that are devoid of 
empirical content, and so cannot be considered scientific.  
Rosenberg (1984) initially articulated this objection 
by making the analogy between geometry and economics. 
He asserted that economic theory relied on a set of 
mathematically convenient assumptions, which had the two-
fold effect of making the theory rich in conceptual clarity, 
but poor in empirical content. In the process of abstracting 
away from the complexities of human interactions, 
economists had landed up creating a discipline quite like 
Euclidean geometry for which no empirical correlates 
existed. He recommended that economics should thus be 
treated as ‘a pure axiomatic system, whose terms may or 
may not be instantiated in the real world, but which is of 
great interest, like Euclidean geometry, whether or not its 
objects really exist’ (p390).  
What I would point out here, is that the chief goal of 
economics is to be a rich theoretical tradition. It is true that 
certain nuggets of economic theory seem pre-ordained to be 
in the economics textbooks, as if it were an unwritten rule 
agreed on by the profession, but undergraduate economics 
textbooks do not define the status of the discipline. Levine 
(2009) went as far as to say that ‘undegraduate economics 
textbooks were an embarrassment to the profession’ because 
they were not consistent with the graduate textbooks that 
more accurately reflect the profession as it is today. Most of 
the empirical developments in economics happen at the 
Ph.D level and do not filter down to the general public. 
What is perceptible to the general public is introductory 
economic theory and economic policy, both of which have 
serious disconnects from the core of the profession. An 
analysis of the work done by nobel-laureate types of 
economists would, I think, speak for the empirical  
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achievements of the subject, because economic theories 
today are merited on their explanatory power not just their 
mathematical elegance. 
Also, the fact that economic theories are 
verifiable only within a certain range of error is, I 
think, well explained by the fact that economists 
study the reactions of human beings. And human 
beings are intrinsically erratic, and predictable with 
only so much certainty. Climatologists, given the 
nature of the phenomena they study, also have only 
so much certainty in their predictions. I think modern 
economics has more consistent predictions than 
climatologists do, and this warrants approval from 
the scientific community. A massive economic 
recession here and there is like every odd natural 
disaster that the climatologists fail to predict. Both 
can be studied in retrospect. 
 
Section 3.2 Commensurability and Empirical Progress 
 Once a scientific theory is established, there is the 
expectation that predictions will have strong empirical 
correspondence to the real world. The physical sciences, rich 
in empirical content, claim to be ‘carving the world at its 
joints’, because the earlier models or theories are 
commensurable with their successors (at least in normal 
science). So for economics, it will not suffice to tell us just 
the logical outcomes of its models if it is to be any more 
than a tautological science. Rosenberg (1983) initially 
defends the economist by pointing to the development of 
heredity from the Mendelian gene.  
There are several scientific theories which to 
varying degrees fail to divide nature at its 
joints. For instance, the Mendelian unit of  
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inheritance cannot be reduced to the 
molecular gene and so does not divide its 
phenomena at the joints. Yet Mendel’s laws 
are useful approximations that we would be 
silly to forgo. 
 
The purpose of models in economics ‘whether 
mathematical or verbal’ is to serve as metaphors 
(Leamer 1996). For Keynes, to convert a model into 
a quantitative formula was to ‘destroy its usefulness 
as an instrument of thought’ (Keynes 1938). Leamer 
(1996) sums up the matter in this oft quoted 
statement: ‘Models are neither true nor false. They 
are sometimes useful and sometimes misleading’. A 
useful way of seeing their relation to the empirical 
world is to compare them to the Ideal Gas Laws. The 
predictions are unambiguous only on a range of 
phenomena, and like the Ideal Gas Laws, they break 
down at (the economic equivalents of) extremes of 
temperature, pressure or volume. Whilst many 
people think that the assumption of rationality is 
rigid in economic models, it is really only a 
simplifying assumption (when irrationality in either 
direction cancels itself out) that is suspended when 
required by the phenomena being studied (for 
example stock bubbles).  
As per Keynes’ standard description of economics: 
“Economics is a science of thinking in terms 
of models joined to the art of choosing 
models which are relevant to the 
contemporary world. It is compelled to be 
this, because unlike the typical natural 
science, the material to which it is applied is,  
  154 
 
in too many respects, not homogenous 
through time.   
 
The final objection I would like to address 
comes from the end of Rosenberg’s article "If 
economics isn't a science, what is it?". He claims that 
no improvement in economic theory could provide 
‘laws governing intentional economic activities’, 
because the claims derived from the fundamental 
assumptions about the determinants of individual 
actions (that people act rationally) ‘can be shown to 
follow from assumptions which are in direct denial’ 
of the ones economists cite. His argument is that the 
general statements made in economics can often be 
shown to be derivable from different starting 
assumptions, some of which may be contradictory. 
This was certainly true of consumer choice theory 
prior to Bentham, which focused on deriving the 
same law of demand from a cardinal notion of 
utility7. Bentham decisively showed that the same 
microeconomic laws could be derived from an 
ordinal notion of utility (that consumers need only be 
able to order their preferences making interpersonal 
comparisons of utility impossible).  
However, one glance at the work of Kuhn 
would convince anyone that this is a problem shared 
by each one of the hard sciences, and if present in 
economics, is only so to a greater degree. The very 
basis for Kuhnian paradigm shifts was that 
revolutions in the scientific world were prompted by  
                                                
7 This meant that consumers had to be able to assign a numeric value to 
the utility derived from different bundles of goods 
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sudden changes in the underlying assumptions of 
theory, the workhorse example being the switch from 
Newtonian mechanics to general relativity. 
In conclusion, I reiterate that each of the 
objections presented to the scientific status of 
economics apply (or have applied) in varying 
degrees to other disciplines that are currently deemed 
scientific. None of them satisfactorily rule out the 
possibility that economics can in the future be 
considered an empirical science. This observation 
opens up two interesting lines of discussion. The first 
is that scientific status is transient and temporal in 
nature. Disciplines can shift between being 
considered scientific and pseuodoscientific over time 
based on the trajectory that they take up. Thagard 
points out that astrology – though now considered a 
pseudo-science, should rightly have been considered 
a science earlier in time because it did not fail the 
demarcation criteria until more recent times. One of 
the reasons he cites is that there weren’t any 
contending theories that better explained the 
phenomena that concerned astrology until recent 
developments in science. This points to the second 
interesting observation: the line between science and 
pseudoscience has as much to do with developments 
outside of the discipline (alternative explanations of 
the same phenomena), as with the methodology 
employed within the discipline.  
The methodology employed by economics, in 
my assessment satisfies to some degree, each of the 
criteria for good science. Whether economics will 
eventually be considered a science depends both on 
developments within the discipline as well as how  
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successful contending explanations of the same 
phenomena are. While I reserve my judgment on its 
eventual status, I assert that the arguments presented 
thus far do not rule out the possibility that economics 
can one day be at par with the other sciences.  
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